The Betnrns to Investment in Higher Levels of Education in Kenya
At independence, Kami stated that it intended to achieve universal free primary education^ In 1967 only those types of education above form 4 were free.2 The reason for the absence of free education at the lower levels is simple: the Government can not afford it.* The reason for the free education at the higher levels is, I would maintain, also simple: it has traditionally been so for those sorts of education (except for forms 5 and 6; which have a Cambridge Certificate (graduation from fo ; rm 4) as a prerequisite. This policy is usually justified on the basis of manpower needs combined with students being unable to afford expensive higher education,^ It is true that few students (or their families) would have the ability to pay out the full cost of these higher levels of education as the costs are incurred (the recurrent cost of a year at the University College Nairobi for one student is £1050, which is some 28 times the average per capita income of £38). This does not imply however that they would be unable, over a number of years, to pay for such education. The objectives of this paper are to determine the return that is currently being earned on educational investment and to determine the return which vrould be earned if the individual had to pay back the cost of the education via a loan programme, so that it can be ascertained whether such a programme is economically feasible.
Lifetime Earnings
Ideally, in a study of the economic returns to education, one would like to have the earnings history of retired people having identical backgrounds and abilities but differing amounts of education. In addition, It would be desirable to have a purely competitive economj^ so that earnings reflected marginal products. Unfortunately such data are not available for any country in the world. 5 Since this study only investigates the private returns to education, and is hence concerned with actual earnings rather than marginal products, the assumption of competitiveness is not required. Because of the short time that high level education has been at all widespread, data for any study of returns to higher levels of education in Kenya will be far from the ideal. Using a number of explicit assumptions, this study will comjmte the private rate 'of return to various amounts of education. The sensitivity of the data to many of these assumptions will be demonstrated 'by introducing marginal changes in the examples and comparing results.
To find a rate of return, one needs to know the earnings histories of persons with and without a specific increment in education and the costs of that increment. Here, only levels of education above Form 4 are considered. 6 Earnings are calculated, in all cases, from government scales for civil servants and teachers.7
By assuming a standard income by education level, all of the problems associated with personal differences between individuals are cut away. Thus, if actual earnings for each person in a cohort were found, in addition to the differences In earnings due to education, one would also need to account for the effect of differences in'ability, race, social class, and many other variables.
For many reasons, earnings of those in the private sector are not considered. First, it would certainly not be easy, and probably not be possible, to determine wage or salary levels by education in the private sector. Trying to estimate how these salaries would increase with the age of the employee would be even more difficult. Also, there may be more variation to private than public sector earnings for effectively the same job, due to the large number of employers in the private sec^o r ,..«•/2 -2 -as opposed to the smaller number in the public sector. As a justification for this procedure, it should be noted that the public' sector employment did amount to one third of total reported employment in 1966 and about 40% of the high level manpower in the country and many feel that the earnings levels in the public sector tend to set the trend for private sector earnings.® Eight categories of earnings and education are considered 4 = 4th form education and 4th form requirement for a job;
4 + = 4th form education plus a government training program of nine months; 6 = 6th form education; PI = 4th form plus two years -of teacher training collegeprimary school teaching; SLA = 6th form plus one year teacher training college-.secondary school teaching; SLB = 4th form plus three years teacher'training collegesecondary school teaching;
A .. = Education through university graduation-earnings on A scale (either civil service or leaching); A+ = Education through university graduation-earnings on A scale followed by Super Scale;
The A scaled (starting' salary £804) is used for university graduates and the minimum increment, in salary each year until the top salary is reached has' been assumed. Here the way is split into two streams: either the man or woman stays at that salary for the rest of his career (this I call the A Scale) or he graduates, it is assumed, to the Super Scale (beginning at £2175) and moves up one salary level per year to the top (this I call the A plus Super Scale or just A+). In fact, to date, people tend to move up more quickly.than this suggests. Balancing against this latter fact are two considerations. First, this rapid promotion can not remain the average behavior as more and more graduates leave the universities and as Africanization is completed. Secondly, only a small proportion of the university graduates will make the Super Scale levels in the long run. Both scales are presented so that the reader can see the sensitivity to the de facto assumptions' associated with each and get an idea of the effect on the rate of return of his own evaluation as to the correct average speed of promotion. G9 is the level at which both 6th and. 4th form graduates come into government, but the latter come in at a lower part of it (£268 as opposed to £548). A fourth form graduate may be taken into a training programme, however, of nine months duration (I call this 4+). After his training such a person would enter at a G? level C£520). Finally, I consider PI (starting at £J48) and SI (starting at.£582),whose lifetime earnings are completely and unambiguously specified by the Government.
These then, are the salary scales. It is still necessary to make assumptions about the number of years in; the work force. Starting with the end of form 4 as year zero, (approximately 18 years of age) persons with each amount of education enter the work force a number of years later, the specific number depending on the education necessary for the scale. Each person is assumed to stay in the work force until age 55 (year 37), the age suggested'by Government for retirement.
To test the sensitivity-of this assumption, I also calculate the effect of staying "an extra three years in the work for.cc.
Since I am concerned -with private returns, earnings after tax are used. Increments in earnings which are taxed away are of no merit to the individual. In addition, housing subsidies are included as part of earnings, as these are part of the job "package" for which education qualifies people. Thus, the thing., that is, called "Earnings" throughout. this paper is actually salary +housing subsidy -taxes.12 The pension is another aspect of the earnings package which has an effect on real income, but it was felt that it is too complex for inclusion in this analysis. Because pensions change as salary changes and they are not realized until retirement, the assumptions necessary to attribute a portion of the value to a specific year would have to be quite arbitrary and would determine completely the effect of their inclusion.
Finally it is assumed that there will be no unemployment at the levels of education which are being considered here. Assuming that any unemployment would appear first among the least educated, unemployment would increase the average increment in earnings of the most highly educated. Therefore, these are probably low estimates of the earnings differential associated with increments in education. (see Table 1 for estimate of lifetime earnings.)
Costs of Education
So much for earnings. Now, costs will be considered. Educational costs are of two types. Pirst there are the direct costs: teachers' salaries, books, stationery, electricity, etc. Second, and sometimes neglected, are the costs of the earnings which are foregone by the students.who are in school rather than in the labor force earning a wageTaking this latter factor first, when earnings increments are considered, as described above, foregone earnings have already been taken into account. That is, the earnings of the individual with the lesser amount o.f education during the years the other man continues his education are, one can assume, the earnings which the person who continues his education is foregoing.1* Thus, part of the / 4 difference between the earnings streams of the two individuals is foregone earnings (OADF in Figure 1 ). Figure 1 demonstrates this relationship between the expenditure-earnings streams diagramatically.
FIGURE 1:
Exrenditure-Earnings Streams
Earnings of a man with educational increment (BGHC)
Earnings for-man with'base education* (OABF)
Earnings common to both (FECI)
Direct cost of education (ODEF)
Let us now consider the direct costs, which may differ for society and the individual, ^ince the ultimate objective of this paper is to investigate the effect on the return to education of a loan programme which would finance the cost of education, both the individual's and societjr's costs are examined. In all cases high, average, and low cost schools are considered separately but the emphasis of the analysis will be on the average cost of schooling. In addition, total and acadomic costs are considered separately, the difference between the two being the cost of such items as would have to be purchased whether or not school is being attended-room, clothes, etc. -which are included in the costs of many schools. The' emphasis here will be on total costs. (See Table  2 for the costs of education in Kenya.) In all cases only recurrent costs are being considered.
Rate of Return
Once the costs and benefits of an investment are determined, a method is needed by which to comDare the two so that alternative investments can be evaluated.^ The two most common methods are comparisons through present values and computation of internal rates of" return. 15 Descriptions of these two -methods follow.
In order to evaluate any investment it is necessary to discount its costs and benefits because of the preferences between present and future income which exist.. Present valued can distinguish between two streams of earnings and thereby objectively determine which is the more valuable. However, present value is extremely sensitive to the rate used in discounting the stream of earnings. When comparing the present value of two earnings streams, their relative size can easily "be reversed by using a different rate, 17 This can happen if . Sources.: Ministry of Education and University College Nairobi.
-^-the earnings streams cross at least once. When dealing with long-lived investments such as railraods, trees, or education, the discount rate used to compare one investment with another is therefore often crucial t
The appropriate discount' rate is to some.degree subjectively determined. That is, one individual's time preference and -risk assessment may be vastly different from that of another. Since, in addition, there is no identifiable "market" rate of interest to seize upon, various discount rates have been used more or less arbitrarily in studies of education.19 Present values can be compared or alternatively, as in this study, the internal rate of return can be computed. The internal rate is the discount rate which equates the present value of the stream of costs, in this case foregone earnings and direct costs of education (OABP + ODEF as seen in Figure 1) , to the present value of the stream of benefits, here the added earnings after education (BGHC).^0 Put another way, it makes the present value of the difference between the two expenditureearnings streams/' (ODEP + PGHI) -0ACI_7 equal zero.
Private Internal Rates of Return Table 3 presents a summary of the internal rates of return currently being earned by the. hypothetical people with the indicated educational increments who earn the assumed lifetime earnings. The Table is read by looking at the y.olumn heading, which is the base amount of education, then"down the column to the figure in the row of the increment in education the effect of which it is desired to find. Por example, to find the internal rate of return to an education which qualifies for a PI teaching post as opposed to a 4th form education, (called Pl-4 for short) look down the column headed by "4" to the row labled PI and the figure 10.6 percent is found.
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The internal rates of return in Table 3 are called private returns because these 'are the returns currently being realized by people who fit the assumptions made as to earnings for these levels of schooling. It should be repeated here that these are returns based on earnings, plus housing subsidies minus income and Graduated Personal taxes, for people who retire at 55. Direct costs do not come into the calculation since all of the levels of schooling considered here are-free. Nevertheless, these are returns because there is a cost of the education to the individual: the earnings he foregoes while in.school. As can be seen, these rates are generally quite high-higher rates of return than most people who invest-in. capital expect to gain. One of the most interesting sequences to note is that through the teaching credentials (PI, SI, and A i.e., graduate). This is not a .time sequence as the training requirements are mutually exclusive rather than cumulative. PI training from the point of view of a 4th form graduate has a private internal rate of return.of 10.6%.' That is, the private costs of achieving a PI certificate, which are the foregone earnings that the 4th form graduate could earn, yield an increment in lifetime earnings such that, the internal rate of return is 10.6%. SI over PI has a return of 39%'. This high "marginal" rate brings the "average" rate for SI education (SI over 4j up to 19%. Nineteen percent, then., is the weighted average of' the PI over' 4 and the SI over PI rates. The education necessary for becoming a graduate teacher (A over Si) has an internal rate of 18.8%. This is also the "average" rate for a graduate teacher's investment (A over 4).
Th-es.e figures suggest that from the point of view of a 4th form graduate, SI and graduate credentials are equally attractive (.19 and 18.8%, respectively) but a PI credential Is much less attractive (10.6%).
The sensitivity of these results to the year or retirement is 'not great. Per example, using a retirement age of 58 rather than 55 increases the private internal rate of'return for PI level education over 4th form from 10.6 to 10.8 percent. Similarly, the rate-.-for university (A) over 4th form increases from 18.8'to 18.9 percent. "These are typical examples' and show
• o / that the-assumption of retirement at age 55 does have an effect on the internal rate of return, but that it is limited to a few tenths of one percentage point.
Internal Rates of Return_ under rious Programs Whereby Students Assume the Cost of Education""'
These then are the current internal rates of return.
v Je now turn to the costs of these increments in education. Table  4 shows the return which would have been realized if the entire recurrent costs of the education had been met, at the time, by the individual receiving the education. This table is for average cost education. The rates of return are cut drastically from those seen in Table 3 . However, they £re still well above those earned, for example, on Kenya Government bonds. This table alone, I think, indicates that a loan programme is indeed feasible. As is seen, SI teachers compared to PI teachers or Higher School Certificate holders.who enter the government service with no other qualification or training, have the highest rate of return to their investment c This is a consequence of the small amount of additional expenditure necessary to move from the one to the other, If costs other than the average total cost were used in this exercise, different results would be found. The internal rates of return have also been calculated for high and low cost schools and for academic costs. The effects of changing these assumptions about cost are shown in Table 5 for two typical increments in education. When the entire cost is met currently, the effect of high versus low cost schools on the internal rate of return.can.be as much as "9-0 percentage points, (looking Table  5 ). The difference between charging the total cost and only the academic cost can be as much as 4.0 or as little as 0 percentage points. . When all of these possibilities are considered together using., these varied assumptions, there can be as much as 9.6 percentage points var iance in the calculated rate of return. No rate is affected so much as to change the "tone" of the result. These -variations demonstrate, however, that the results of this analysis should be used with caution and that orders of magnitude are more reliable than exact figures.
The conditions of a loan programme of any sort would not be nearly as stringent as those used in calculating the returns presented in Table 4 . When the costs are paid over a period of years as opposed to immediately, the population which can take advantage of higher education is changed from an extremely limited one to all those with the necessary ability. There, the full cost of the education was paid as it was being realized. Any loan programme would require re-payment only after the education began to bear monetary fruit. Two sorts of repayment plans are considered here.21 In neither is an interest charged on the loan. The effect of an interest charge will be calculated in the near future. In the first a payment of a specific amount each month would be made until the balance of the loan had been repaid. In the second program,a percentage of income would be paid annually for life.
For the program of repayment in which a specified sum was paid each month beginning one year after completion of the course of study, the figures of £10 per month for a university graduate and £2/10 per month for all lower levels were somewhat arbitrarily chosen. These rates do have the virtue of paying off the loan in a maximum of 28 years«,22 Table 6 , which presents the rates of return under this repayment program shows a high return for almost all levels, usually between 15 and 30 percent. In all cases the rates here are well above those shown in. Table 4 . This is a result of no interest being included in these calculations for the loan program. Since the payment is over a long period of time Instead of immediately as in "the calculations for Table 4 , the internal rate is much higher. From a prely economic point of view, these figures also suggest that a repayment program is feasible. Most levels of education would still have a return much higher than could be derived from investment In physical capital or securities.
The second repayment program is of the type which has 7 recently been much publicized and discussed in the United States. It has been suggested that the charge on lifetime earnings be 1 percent per each $3000 (£1072) borrowed. I suggest a repayment of 1 percent of lifetime income per £700 borrowed for Kenya because the returns to education are higher here and the smaller amount (1% per £1072) would not even pay back the cost whereas 1% per £700 will. In an extensive study I found returns to university over secondary school education in the United States were 9 percent,24 as opposed to the private returns in Kenya of about 25 percent, as seen above, This program has the virtue of not affecting adversely the person who is unemployed or desires to go into a low paying, but quite worthwhile occupation since such a person pays back one percent of his income per £700 borrowed just as does the corporation president or permanent secretary who earns a much higher salary. It is just a smaller amount. The effect; is for the latter to subsidize the former. But since the repayment is. a fixed, and low, percentage of income, it does not impose many hardships on the individual. This plan has the further advantage of'being a sort of surcharge on the income tax which automatically comes due and could even be included in PAYE (pay-as you-earn).
• o • • y / ^ From an educational point of view, there is little doubt that a loan program would have beneficial results. Students who are committing a proportion of their future earnings in order to attend school will certainly be more serious about their studies than students who are "getting a free ride 11 at the expense of Government. They will not only benefit in their academic studies but also in their attitudes towards the world and work.25 What remains at question is the political and social feasibility of such a program. Many have suggested that loans for education are* impossible to collect in a» less developed country like Kenya. It is argued that the pressures of the extended family on the successful individual are so great that there is never any excess which could be used to retire educational loans. While -it -is-'quite clear: that this type of-, pressure does exist and is indeed heavy for many individuals, it is also clear that methods could be devised which would assist the individual in successfully resisting such pressures. The successful loans-for the-hire-purchase of automobiles is one example of the old"maxim "where there is a will, there is a way." ..The. fact that few salaried people are continually in arrears on their income and graduated personal taxes is another indication of this Same thing. What I am suggesting is that if the•right program is instituted with sufficient incentives
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and sanctions repayment will not be politically or socially impracticable. A loan program's economic feasibility has already been demonstrated.
The Government of Kenya already has a loan program which has made some 294 loans in its 15 years of existence.Ninetysix, or 33 percent, have been repaid while only five (2%) have been written off as losses.. Nevertheless, this program has not been considered a success by most Government officials. The program has been small and repayments have been slow, I 7;ould suggest that there is a causal relationship here. There is a great feeling that the program is unfair because only a small minority of all those receiving higher education have to pay for it. It would appear that a. program encompassing all students would have a much better chance of success in collecting the money due and receiving popular support.
Government's Internal Rates of Return
Some have suggested that the increased tax revenue associated with the increased income of those with higher education adequately compensates. Government for the cost of that education. Table 8 presents the internal rate of return realized by Government on educational investment expenditure. The "return" to Government is the increment in tax revenue associated with the higher earnings of the more educated •• individuals. The calculation, then, is a comparison of total expenditure on education 'to taxes received* This implicitly assumes that the jobs for which the specified education "qualifies" individuals would not be filled if there-were ho "'•-' Government supported education. To the extent that such jobs are filled 'by expatriates, undereduoated people, or privately educated people, the internal rate of return to. government is infinite, as these have no cost to government.
As can be seen, the majority of the figures are very small. I would argue that even if the return to Government was quite high in every case, this would be no justification for the free education which is now current. The tax structure is aimed at having each person shoulder a portion, based on his income, of the : expense of Government. This is quite separate from the issue of free education. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that loan programs for higher levels of education would not "be a heavy • economic 'burden on students. The loan program which requires the repayment of a percentage of income for life is one which should be politically feasible as well. The "welfare implication of the present situation versus the situation which would exist in a "loan program world" are obvious. In this connection it might be useful to point out that the resources support ing one university student for one year could support 130 primary school students for that period.27
Alternatively, the resources could be used for general Government development purpose-s. In either case, a redistribu tion from the most, to the least, affluent would result. 13* If one year increments of education were being compared, this would fully account for the foregone earnings. However, if educational increments of more than one year are being considered (e.g., two years of college vs. secondary school graduation) it is a moot question as to whether the earnings differential between the two people being compared fully • represents the earnings foregone. One of the two possibilities to be reconciled is that at the end of first year the additional year of education might mean that the moreeducated man would have a higher marginal product than the less educated individual, so that the latter's earnings in the second year are not as great as the former's earnings potential. On the other hand, the less educated man has one year of experience which adds to his value in the second year over that of a man who is first entering the ?\rork force. The difference in value between a year of schooling and a year or working experience is difficult to estimate expirically. 'The problem becomes rather more complex when people with larger differences in education are being compared.
14. Where: PV= present value; R= return in a given period; r= the discount rate per period; and i= the period. 
